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Consent behind Bars: Should It Be a Defense 
against Inmates’ Claims of Sexual Assault? 
Nika Arzoumanian† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Understanding what constitutes “consent” sits at the heart of the 
#MeToo Movement, but consent can take on a variety of meanings de-
pending on the context in which parties give and receive it.1 The #Me-
Too Movement gained initial traction when women spoke out against 
harassment in the workplace and Hollywood, but the questions #MeToo 
raises apply far beyond those boundaries. Specifically, prison inmates 
are largely left out of the #MeToo discussion, particularly women and 
gender minorities.2  
Exploring #MeToo in the prison context is critical for two reasons. 
First, considering whether consent is possible when bodily autonomy is 
severely restricted will expand our understanding of consent’s outer-
most bounds. Second, almost 2.2 million American adults were in prison 
or jail at the end of 2016; the impact of prison on issues relevant to the 
#MeToo Movement applies to a significant proportion of Americans.3 
Startling statistics reflect high and rising numbers of sexual as-
sault allegations in correctional facilities.4 In 2011, prisoners made 
 
 †  B.A. 2016, New York University; J.D. Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law 
School. Many thanks to Professor John Rappaport for his thoughtful feedback throughout the 
Comment writing process, as well to Professor Daniel Hemel for his insightful advice on this piece. 
I would also like to thank the members of the 2018–2019 Board of The University of Chicago Legal 
Forum for their constant guidance and commitment to excellence in legal scholarship. 
 1 See Lee Tunstall, #MeToo Ushers in the Age of Consent, THE SEATTLE TIMES (June 7, 2018), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/metoo-ushers-in-the-age-of-consent/ [https://perma.cc/5XZZ 
-YTH9]. 
 2 See Marisa Endicott, ‘No Longer Human’: Women’s Prisons Are a Breeding Ground for Sex-
ual Harassment, Abuse, THINK PROGRESS (Aug. 29, 2018), https://thinkprogress.org/sexual-harass-
ment-abuse-womens-prisons-me-too-5231b62c1785/ [https://perma.cc/4GD3-3VVT]. 
 3 Drew Kann, 5 Facts Behind America’s High Incarceration Rate, CNN (July 10, 2018), https:/  
/www.cnn.com/2018/06/28/us/mass-incarceration-five-key-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/K2U 
U-3K5G]. 
 4 See Alysia Santo, Prison Rape Allegations Are on the Rise, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (July 
25, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/07/25/prison-rape-allegations-are-on-the-rise 
[https://perma.cc/FV2G-4FNV]. 
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8,768 allegations of sexual assault and harassment across the United 
States, whereas by the end of 2015, prisoners made 24,661 allegations 
of sexual assault and harassment.5 Yet, the possibility of consensual 
sexual contact in prison—particularly between inmates and guards—is 
less often a topic of discussion. 
Much of the time, sexual contact between inmates and correctional 
officers in prison is identified at the time as “consensual” or “ap-
pear[ing] to be willing.”6 That being said, many scholars and prisoners’ 
rights advocates argue that a significant proportion, if not all, of seem-
ingly consensual sexual contact between guards and inmates is non-
consensual, the product of either physical force or non-physical coer-
cion.7 Prisoners are bringing claims of excessive force under the Eighth 
Amendment on these same grounds. Often characterized by gift-giving 
and special treatment, the relationships they describe may seem con-
sensual in the outside world. However, the fact that they develop in 
prison raises a series of unique concerns: specifically, can consent even 
exist in prison, particularly between guards and inmates? 
Uncertainty regarding the definition of consent has given rise to a 
dispute both within the judiciary and among scholars as to whether con-
sent is or should be a defense to an Eighth Amendment excessive force 
claim based on sexual acts between inmates and correctional officers. 
In order to resolve this issue, I will argue in favor of the mixed approach 
taken by the Ninth Circuit: prisoners are “entitled to a presumption 
that any relationship with a correctional officer is not consensual,” but 
the defendant can “rebut this presumption by showing that the rela-
tionship ‘involved no coercive factors’” beyond the background coercion 
that prison already imposes.8 
This Comment champions a prisoner-centered approach using the-
ories of bodily autonomy and also explores why a per se rule is inappro-
priate in the inmate-guard context, despite being accepted in regulating 
other forms of sexual contact. I will review the current status of legisla-
tion pertaining to prison sexual assault, as well as the general structure 
under which a prisoner may bring an Eighth Amendment sexual as-
sault claim. I will also explain the various perspectives circuit courts 
 
 5 Id. 
 6 Margaret Penland, A Constitutional Paradox: Prisoner “Consent” to Sexual Abuse in Prison 
Under the Eighth Amendment, 33 LAW & INEQ. 507, 508–09 (2015). 
 7 Merideth J. Hogan, If Orange is the New Black, is Coercion the New Consent? An Analysis 
of the Tenth Circuit’s Decision to Allow Guards to Use an Inmate’s Alleged Consent as a Defense to 
a Sexual Abuse Allegation, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 425, 425 (2015). 
 8 M. Jackson Jones, Power, Control, Cigarettes, and Gum: Whether an Inmate’s Consent to 
Engage in a Relationship with a Correctional Officer Can Be a Defense to the Inmate’s Allegation 
of a Civil Rights Violation Under the Eighth Amendment, 19 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADV. 275, 
278 (2014) (citing Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1049 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
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and scholars have put forth to determine whether inmate consent 
should be a defense to prison sexual assault claims and explore the fac-
tors that differentiate consent in prison from consent in the outside 
world. I will then advocate for the Ninth Circuit’s mixed approach, fo-
cusing on the harms of limiting bodily autonomy in prison, how the 
mixed approach operates to ensure prisoner safety, and how prisoner-
guard relationships differ from other contexts where per se rules 
against sexual contact are enforced. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF CONSENT IN PRISON 
A.  Federal and State Legislation 
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)9 and the Prison Rape 
Elimination Act (PREA)10 are the two most relevant pieces of federal 
legislation passed in recent history on the issue of prisoner sexual as-
sault. The PLRA places restrictions on inmates seeking to bring suit in 
federal court. Most notably, the PLRA requires that inmates must ex-
haust all available administrative remedies, including internal griev-
ance systems within their prisons before bringing any claim in federal 
court.11 The Supreme Court has interpreted exhaustion as “proper ex-
haustion,” requiring that “prisoners must follow all of the procedural 
rules that detention agencies have developed for internal grievances be-
fore suing.”12 This process often involves very short timelines for filing 
grievances, a particularly dangerous roadblock in the context of sexual 
assault where inmates may struggle emotionally to bring claims in a 
timely manner.13 
 
 9 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012). 
 10 28 C.F.R. § 115 (2012). 
 11 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“[N]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under 
section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1983), or any other Federal 
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administra-
tive remedies as are available are exhausted.”). 
 12 Gabriel Arkles, Prison Rape Elimination Act Litigation and the Perpetuation of Sexual 
Harm, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 809–10 (2014) (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 
94 (2006)). 
 13 Id. at 810. Furthermore, since the passage of an amendment to the Violence Against Women 
Act (VAWA) in February 2013, a “prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual 
act” is necessary for recovery under the PLRA for mental or emotional injury. The PLRA defines a 
“sexual act” as: 
(A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the anus, and for purposes 
of this subparagraph contact involving the penis occurs upon penetration, however 
slight; 
(B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the mouth 
and the anus; 
(C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of another by a hand 
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The conversation regarding sexual assault in prison would be in-
complete without at least a brief discussion of the PREA, which estab-
lished a “zero tolerance” policy for rape and sexual assault perpetrated 
by both prisoners and prison staff across various forms of detention.14 
The PREA calls for wide-sweeping data collection about rape in prison, 
as well as increased surveillance, policing, and criminalization of prison 
rape.15 However, the PREA does not create a private right of action or 
an affirmative defense.16 For this reason, courts often do not explicitly 
consider the PREA when adjudicating Eighth Amendment prisoner sex-
ual assault claims.17 Instead, the penalty is targeted towards state de-
tention agencies: if they fail to comply with the PREA, they will receive 
a reduction in federal funds.18 
Most states have passed legislation that prohibits sexual relation-
ships between inmates and correctional officers regardless of consent, 
and many states have passed legislation that prohibits sexual activity 
between inmates as well.19 A few states’ statutes even explicitly stipu-
late that inmates are “incapable of consent to sexual relations with a 
[correctional employee].”20 In contrast, Arizona, Nevada, and Delaware 
not only acknowledge inmate consent but also allow for the prosecution 
of inmates who “willingly” engage in sexual contact with prison staff.21 
B.  Sexual Assault in Prison and the Eighth Amendment 
Inmates typically bring claims of sexual abuse in prison through 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 on Eighth Amendment grounds, which requires that the 
 
or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse 
or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or 
(D) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person 
who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, 
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. 
18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)(a)–(d) (2012). Prior to 2013, “the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) required 
physical injury before a claim for emotional or mental violation could be heard. This created a 
loophole for some sexual assault cases in which the victim could not prove physical injury, since 
the court defined injury not to include penetration, thereby blocking a claim even for emotional or 
mental damages. An amendment to the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), however, eventu-
ally closed this loophole, barring courts from defining sexual violence as less than physical injury 
by explicitly listing sexual acts as injury.” Hannah Belitz, A Right Without a Remedy: Sexual Abuse 
in Prison and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 291, 295 n.29 (2018). 
 14 Gabriel Arkles, supra note 12, at 804–05 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 15602 (2012)). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 802. 
 17 Id. at 811. 
 18 Id. at 806. 
 19 Jones, supra note 8, at 293. 
 20 Id. (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, § 21A (2013)) (emphasis added). 
 21 Hannah Brenner, Bars to Justice: The Impact of Rape Myths on Women in Prison, 17 GEO. 
J. GENDER & L. 521, 546 n.151 (2016). 
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inmate meet two prongs.22 First, the abuse must be “objectively harmful 
enough to establish a constitutional violation” under “societal standards 
of decency.”23 Second, the alleged assaulter must have had “actual 
knowledge of danger to the prisoner and [chose] not to prevent it.”24 
However, the test is simplified in the excessive force context. In Hudson 
v. McMillian,25 the Supreme Court decided that if the alleged assaulter 
had actual knowledge of danger to the prisoner and chose not to prevent 
it, the court should assume the abuse was objectively harmful enough 
to establish a constitutional violation under societal standards of de-
cency.26 Essentially, if the second prong is met, the first prong is also 
met. 
In Hudson, the Court held in favor of an inmate who brought an 
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after 
he sustained minor injuries from being beaten by guards while hand-
cuffed.27 The Court held that whether the second prong is met in an 
excessive force analysis hinges on “whether force was applied in a good-
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadisti-
cally to cause harm.”28 If force was applied in order to maliciously and 
sadistically cause harm, societal standards of decency are always vio-
lated, regardless of the severity of the injury.29 The Court explained that 
if this rule were not established, the Eighth Amendment “would permit 
any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting 
less than some arbitrary quantity of injury”; the significance of the in-
jury does not matter.30 
Sexual assault is always sufficient to meet the second prong of the 
test because courts assume sexual assault is always force applied mali-
ciously and sadistically to cause harm, and therefore violates societal 
standards of decency, regardless of the assaulter’s actual state of mind 
or the severity of the injury.31 However, this merely shifts the excessive 
force inquiry when abuse claims are made to whether the guard has in 
fact sexually abused the inmate, making the uncertainty over whether 
 
 22 Gabriel Arkles, supra note 12, at 804–05 (2014) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 
667 (1962)). 
 23 Hogan, supra note 7, at 432–33 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (emphasis 
added)). 
 24 Arkles, supra note 12, at 807–08 (2014) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) 
(emphasis added)). 
 25 503 U.S. 1 (1992). 
 26 Id. at 9. 
 27 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 12. 
 28 Id. at 6. 
 29 Id. at 9. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding sexual abuse 
constitutes “conduct which itself establishes . . . sufficient evidence” of malicious intent). 
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consent is a defense to an inmate-guard sexual assault claim even more 
critical to address. 
C. The Majority Approach: Consent Is a Defense to Eighth Amend-
ment Sexual Assault Claims 
The Eighth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have found that “voluntary” 
consensual relationships between inmates and correctional officers do 
not violate the Eighth Amendment.32 In Freitas v. Ault,33 a male inmate 
entered into a seemingly voluntary intimate relationship with a female 
correctional officer, during which they would regularly kiss, hug, talk, 
and write “hot sexy” letters to one another.34 The inmate ended the re-
lationship upon learning the correctional officer was sleeping with an-
other man and subsequently alleged that she had sexually harassed 
him.35 The Eighth Circuit decided in favor of the correctional officer and 
held that, “at the very least, welcome and voluntary sexual interactions, 
no matter how inappropriate, cannot as a matter of law constitute ‘pain’ 
as contemplated by the Eighth Amendment.”36 Similarly, in Hall v. Bea-
vin,37 a male inmate claimed an Eighth Amendment violation after he 
was disciplined for his sexual relationship with a female correctional 
officer.38 The Sixth Circuit held in favor of the defendants because the 
inmate did not prove the correctional officer had sexually assaulted 
him, but rather that he “voluntarily” engaged in the sexual relation-
ship.39 
Initially, the Tenth Circuit’s approach was diametrically opposed 
to that of the Eighth and Sixth Circuits. Until 2013, the Tenth Circuit 
had held the Eighth Amendment precludes, as a per se rule, inmates 
and correctional officers from entering into sexual relationships with 
one another, regardless of consent.40 For example, in Lobozzo v. Colo-
rado Department of Corrections,41 a female inmate entered into a sexual 
relationship with a male correctional officer that appeared to involve no 
coercive factors. The Tenth Circuit ruled per se in favor of the inmate.42 
 
 32 See Hall v. Beavin, No 98-3802, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29700, at *4 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1999); 
Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335, 1339 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 33 109 F.3d 1335, 1339 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 34 Id. at 1336. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 1339. 
 37 No. 98-3802, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29700, at *4 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1999). 
 38 Hall at *4. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See Lobozzo v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 429 F. App’x. 707, 711 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 41 429 F. App’x. 707, 711 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 42 See id. at 711. 
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However, the Tenth Circuit changed course in Graham v. Sheriff of 
Logan County43 and adopted the standard held by the Sixth and Eighth 
Circuits.44 In Graham, an inmate and guard exchanged “sexually ex-
plicit notes” and regularly spoke about wanting to have sexual inter-
course with one another.45 On two occasions, the guard fulfilled the in-
mate’s requests for a candy bar and a blanket, but the inmate stated at 
trial that she “did not think that she had received any special treatment 
from [the guard].”46 Ultimately, the inmate engaged in sexual inter-
course with the guard she had been speaking with and another male 
guard after she was placed in solitary confinement for an unrelated of-
fense.47 The inmate said the intercourse was consensual as it pertained 
to the guard she had been speaking with prior to the incident, but 
“didn’t really want [the other one] there.”48 In its opinion, the court em-
phasized: 
[The inmate] did nothing to indicate lack of consent when the 
guards entered her cell, when they removed her clothing, or 
when they touched her. She never told either of them that she 
did not want to have sex. She has stated repeatedly and consist-
ently that almost all the sexual acts that occurred were consen-
sual.49 
The Tenth Circuit bolstered its departure from its decision in Lo-
bozzo by emphasizing that Lobozzo was an unpublished opinion and not 
binding in the Tenth Circuit.50 The court also relied on the fact that the 
judiciary had not reached a consensus as to whether consent is a de-
fense to Eighth Amendment sexual assault claims.51 The court treated 
the case as a matter of first impression and held that “absent contrary 
guidance from the Supreme Court . . . it [is] proper to treat sexual abuse 
of prisoners as a species of excessive-force claim, requiring at least some 
 
 43 741 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 44 Id. at 1126. 
 45 Id. at 1120–21 (the court included in its opinion the text of a note the inmate had written 
to the guard: “Hey Sexy, Damn you look good in that uniform. I just want to rip it off of you. I can 
only imagine what you’ll look like in that deputy uniform. Mmm . . . the state troopers uniforms 
are real sexy! The hat and all. I look forward to f**king you in, or around your patrol car. Damn, 
just the thought of that gets my nipples hard. I’m such a nympho! Can you deal with that? Because 
I want it all the time. Seriously, I think I might be a sex addict. So there’s a little bit more you 
know about me. Have I freaked you out yet? I hope not cuz that’s not my intention. . . . You haven’t 
smiled for me. What’s up? You down? Cheer up handsome. Peace.”). 
 46 Id. at 1121. 
 47 Id. at 1120. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 1123. 
 50 Id. at 1124. 
 51 Id. 
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form of coercion (not necessarily physical) by the prisoner’s custodians,” 
adopting the Sixth and Eighth Circuit approach.52 Today, under this 
majority approach, the inmate bears the burden to prove the sexual con-
duct was not consensual, otherwise known as the “burdened-inmate” 
rule.53 
D. The Proposed Per Se Rule: Consent Is Never a Defense to Eighth 
Amendment Sexual Assault Claims 
Although no circuit court has endorsed a per se rule under which 
prisoners are incapable of consent to sexual relations with a guard, the 
scholarship on this topic overwhelmingly supports a rule stipulating 
consent is never a defense to an Eighth Amendment sexual assault 
claim.54 Some district courts have endorsed this view as well. In Carri-
gan v. Davis,55 a female inmate alleged she had been raped by a guard, 
whereas the guard alleged he had been seduced by the inmate and en-
gaged in consensual oral sex with her.56 The District Court of Delaware 
held as a matter of law that “an act of vaginal intercourse and/or fellatio 
between a prison inmate and a prison guard, whether consensual or not, 
is a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment.”57 The court emphasized 
that the Delaware legislature had “concluded that such action, whether 
consensual or not, constitutes a criminal offense,”58 and the legislature 
is the “clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary 
values.”59 The court also reaffirmed that sexual conduct between pris-
oners and guards “destabilizes the prison environment by compromis-
ing the control and authority of the guard over the inmate, compromis-
ing the inmate’s health, security and well-being and creating tensions 
and conflicts among the inmates themselves.”60 The Western District of 
New York took an approach similar to Carrigan in Cash v. County of 
 
 52 Id. at 1126. 
 53 Hogan, supra note 7, at 426. 
 54 See generally Brenda V. Smith, Prison and Punishment: Rethinking Prison Sex: Self-Ex-
pression and Safety, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 185 (2006); Hannah Brenner et al., supra note 21; 
M. Jackson Jones, supra note 19; Joanna E. Saul, Of Sexual Bondage: the “Legitimate Penological 
Interest” in Restricting Sexual Expression in Women’s Prisons, 15 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 349 (2009); 
Hogan, supra note 7; Kristen Seddiqui, Graham v. Sheriff of Logan County: Coercion in Rape and 
the Plight of Women Prisoners, 92 DEV. U.L. REV. 671 (Fall 2015); Megan Coker, Common Sense 
About Common Decency: Promoting a New Standard for Guard-on-Inmate Sexual Abuse Under the 
Eighth Amendment, 100 VA. L. REV. 437 (2014). 
 55 70 F. Supp. 2d 448 (D. Del. 1999). 
 56 Id. at 451. 
 57 Id. at 452–53. 
 58 Id. at 453. 
 59 Id. (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)). 
 60 Carrigan, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 454. 
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Erie,61 quickly rejecting the guard’s defense that the sexual contact be-
tween himself and the inmate had been “physically consensual” on per 
se grounds under New York state law.62 
E. The Ninth Circuit’s Mixed Approach: Consent May Be a Defense 
to Eighth Amendment Sexual Assault Claims 
The Ninth Circuit has taken a mixed approach to resolving this is-
sue: consent may be a defense to an Eighth Amendment sexual assault 
claim, but an inmate is entitled to a strong presumption that any in-
mate-guard relationship is non-consensual.63 In Wood v. Beauclair,64 
the Ninth Circuit held “inmates are entitled to a presumption that any 
relationship with a correctional officer is not consensual,” but the de-
fendant can “rebut this presumption by showing that the relationship 
‘involved no coercive factors.’”65 The court did not “attempt to exhaust-
ively describe every factor that could be fairly characterized as coer-
cive.”66 However, it did state that while “explicit assertions of non-con-
sent indicate coercion,” “favors, privileges, or any type of exchange for 
sex” may also indicate coercion.67 
In Wood, a male inmate entered into an intimate relationship with 
a female correctional officer that appeared to involve no coercive factors 
at its onset.68 They “conversed often about personal topics” and occa-
sionally hugged, kissed, and touched each other on the arms and legs.69 
Upon learning that the correctional officer was married, the inmate at-
tempted to end the relationship, but the correctional officer responded 
by beginning to make explicit sexual advances towards the inmate, in-
cluding cupping his groin.70 
The Ninth Circuit held that inmates are entitled to the presump-
tion that any inmate-guard relationship is non-consensual.71 The de-
fendant, however, may rebut that presumption with evidence that his 
or her conduct was not coercive.72 Under this standard, the correctional 
officer bears the burden of proving both parties consented to the sexual 
 
 61 No. 04-CV-0182(M), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134049 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2009). 
 62 Id. at *6. 
 63 Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 64 692 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 65 Jones, supra note 19, at 278 (citing Wood, 692 F.3d at 1049 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
 66 Wood, 692 F.3d at 1049. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 1047. 
 69 Id. at 1044. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
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contact.73 In this case, the state could not show that the guard’s behav-
ior was not coercive, so the court ruled in favor of the inmate.74 The 
court was particularly concerned with the fact that “the power dynam-
ics between prisoners and guards make it difficult to discern consent 
from coercion” and wanted to establish a rule that “explicitly recog-
nize[d] the coercive nature of sexual relations in the prison environ-
ment.”75 
Numerous opinions from lower courts in the Ninth Circuit posi-
tively cite Wood, but they usually do so for its presumption that any 
inmate-guard relationship is presumptively non-consensual rather 
than its test for consent.76 The exception to this rule is Manago v. Wil-
liams,77 decided in 2013 by the Eastern District of California. An inmate 
alleged prison guard Mary Brockett had verbally harassed him in a sex-
ual manner.78 After the verbal harassment, he agreed to take part in an 
investigation of her misconduct in compliance with prison officials.79 
The inmate alleged that Brockett “‘French kissed’ him, touched his gen-
itals, slapped his buttocks, and orally copulated him” without his con-
sent while the investigation was proceeding.80 Even though the inmate 
seemingly consented to the behavior and at times initiated sexual con-
tact, he did so because he was directed by officials to “snar[e] Brockett 
in official misconduct.”81 
The court held that the Wood test required a ruling against Brock-
ett because her behavior was coercive.82 Further, the court emphasized 
that “any allegedly personal interest that [the] plaintiff may have had 
in a consensual sexual relationship with Brockett, which [the] plaintiff 
denies, is overshadowed by [the investigation’s] reliance on [the] plain-
tiff, underscored by [the] plaintiff’s officially facilitated recording of his 
interactions with Brockett.”83 The court did not find compelling the ar-
gument that the inmate was discouraged from engaging in sexual con-
duct.84 The inmate also testified that he engaged in sexual activity with 
 
 73 Hogan, supra note 7, at 426. 
 74 Id. at 1049. 
 75 Id. 
 76 See, e.g., Cleveland v. Curry, No. 07-cv-02809-NJV, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22402, at *49 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2014) (“under Wood, [defendant’s] sexual conduct ‘itself constitute[d] sufficient 
evidence that force was used ‘maliciously and sadistically’ for the very purpose of causing harm’”). 
 77 No. 2:07-cv-2290 LKK KJN P, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183734 (E.D. Cal. March 13, 2013). 
 78 Id. at 57. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 59. 
 81 Id. at 57. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
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Brockett solely for the purposes of the investigation and took active 
steps to request the cessation of the investigation.85 
III. FACTORS WEIGHING AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSENT IN THE 
PRISON ENVIRONMENT 
A wealth of scholarship addresses consent from a variety of angles, 
the breadth of which is impossible to cover comprehensively in a Com-
ment of this scope. I will highlight the arguments flagged by scholars 
focusing on issues of consent in prison. 
A. Power Imbalance and Consent 
Most scholars who advocate for a per se rule against consent as a 
defense to Eighth Amendment sexual assault claims argue an “inherent 
power imbalance between guard and inmate” exists that is “analogous 
to the inherent power imbalance between adult and child.”86 Prison ex-
erts extreme levels of control over inmates’ day-to-day lives: correc-
tional officers control “every aspect of the inmates whom they supervise, 
from privacy to opportunities to eat or bathe or interact with others, 
culminating in the ultimate amount of time the inmates must stay in 
prison.”87 Correctional officers also utilize their authority to “provide 
goods and privileges as a method of compelling sexual relations or with-
holding goods and privileges as punishment for not engaging in sexual 
contact.”88 Scholars advocating for the per se rule also worry about the 
impact of the “social hierarchy” of prison on inmates’ ability to con-
sent.89 The pecking order of the inmates, based on the length of time 
spent in prison and the nature of their criminal history, can increase 
the likelihood of sexual coercion taking place, though most scholars dis-
cussing the social hierarchy are concerned about its effect on relation-
ships between inmates.90 
Much of the scholarship in favor of a per se rule at least acknowl-
edges that power differentials exist between sexual partners outside of 
prison as well.91 One partner may be in a far better financial situation 
than another or hold a position of social or professional authority over 
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the other. That being said, there are compelling arguments as to why 
the prison context is unique. In prison, inmates lack freedom of associ-
ation. They must continue to interact with guards based not on their 
own preferences but on those of the correctional facility.92 If a guard is 
assigned to a particular role that requires him or her to interact with a 
particular inmate on a regular basis, the inmate has limited means by 
which to remove him or herself from that situation. In addition, rela-
tionships that were once consensual can transform as conditions 
change, and these changes are almost never subject to the control of the 
prisoner. As one inmate put it, “sometimes it starts off being consen-
sual, but then later it becomes an abusive situation.”93 Furthermore, 
some scholars argue that the total deprivation of liberty inherent in im-
prisonment requires the correctional system to shield inmates from 
“sexual pressure.”94 Because the prison system strips inmates of much 
of their autonomy, the prison system also has a heightened responsibil-
ity to protect them from sexual coercion. 
Scholars are also concerned that relationships between inmates 
and guards can “disrupt the prison environment,” bringing about jeal-
ousy from other inmates who believe, whether correctly or incorrectly, 
that the inmate is receiving extra privileges as a result of a sexual re-
lationship with a correctional officer.95 Much of the coercive sexual con-
tact in prison is not characterized by physical force but is rather in ex-
change for privileges or power.96 In fact, “nearly half of the [correctional 
officers] in . . . sexual abuse cases also smuggled contraband into pris-
ons for the inmates with whom they had sexual relationships.”97 
Exchanging sex acts for increased privileges is a particularly strong 
form of coercion in the prison context, where freedoms many take for 
granted in the outside world become luxuries. Privileges exchanged for 
sexual contact range from additional phone usage and greater contact 
with an inmate’s children to desired goods such as cigarettes or gum.98 
In the often austere prison environment where inmates have little au-
tonomy over their own lives, such privileges are particularly valuable. 
This reality can lead to a dynamic that is not only coercive in nature 
but also to significant underreporting of sexual assault, as many in-
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mates believe reporting could result in not “receiving unauthor-
ized privileges or contraband in exchange for the sexual acts [he or she 
committed].”99 
Scholars raise other concerns about the prison environment’s im-
pact on consent: for example, overcrowding increases the probability of 
sexual coercion taking place.100 At first blush, this concern may seem 
counter-intuitive: overcrowding means decreased privacy, supposedly 
leading to more potential witnesses when a sexual assault takes place. 
However, this reduction of privacy and less supervision can actually 
make it easier for guards and inmates to commit sexual abuse.101 There 
are “more bodies in the showers, more eyes of the guards and other in-
mates, more inmates being strip-searched together after visitation, and 
greater need to place more inmates together in sleeping arrangements 
that may increase an inmate’s vulnerability.”102 Over-crowding leads to 
a higher inmate-to-guard ratio and greater anonymity within the 
prison, making it easier for guards and inmates to engage in sex acts 
without being detected, regardless of consent. 
B. The Relationship Between Incarceration and Sexuality 
Some scholars argue incarceration is “inherently a sexual punish-
ment” because of the extent to which prisons exercise control over pris-
oners’ bodily autonomy and integrity, and that sexual coercion is “an 
inherent aspect of mass confinement.”103 Violence and social hierarchies 
are essential to the functioning of prison, not merely “accidental or su-
perfluous” elements of the prison experience.104 Therefore, any efforts 
to increase bodily autonomy of prisoners or legislate to protect them 
from sexual violence will be incomplete at best.105 Because the Ameri-
can prison system relies on “total control over the bodies and behaviors 
of prisoners” and depriving prisoners of any self-determination, incar-
ceration cannot exist without total control over prisoner sexuality and 
depriving prisoners of any sexual self-determination as well.106 
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C. The Impact of Stereotyping on Determining Consent 
Some scholars argue stereotyping of correctional officers as “good 
guys” and of prisoners as “bad guys” more likely to be sexual aggressors 
negatively impacts prisoners’ likelihood of success in bringing sexual 
assault claims. Juries and judges tend to favor correctional officers, 
who, given their position as law enforcement officers, are considered to 
have a “moral and upstanding character” and are assumed to comply 
with the rules.107 In contrast, the benefit of the doubt usually cuts 
against the claims of prisoners, who—assuming the justice system is 
working properly—have engaged in at least some criminal behavior in 
the past and society often deems “inherently deviant.”108 If they have 
broken rules in the past, the thought goes, why would they not do so 
again? Because of inmates’ perceived “deviance,” juries and judges may 
be subject to implicit bias and more likely to make incorrect judicial 
decisions by assuming these characters are both more likely to be the 
sexual aggressor or want to consent to sex.109 
D. Mental Illness, Family History, and Consent 
Some scholars emphasize the prevalence of mental illness among 
inmates and that inmates with mental illness are “at an increased risk 
of sexual victimization.”110 Furthermore, histories of physical and sex-
ual abuse are common among inmates, particularly women: “of female 
inmates in state prisons, 57.2% reported being abused prior to admis-
sion; 46.5% reported physical abuse, and 39% reported sexual abuse. Of 
those who reported abuse, 40.1% experienced abuse at the hands of a 
family member, and 60.1%, by an ‘intimate’ [partner].”111 Some argue 
that “it is possible that these women may transpose their expectations 
and experiences from their real family onto their prison family and be 
accepting of abuse as part of the family dynamic.”112 
IV. THE MERITS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S MIXED APPROACH 
This Comment will argue the Ninth Circuit’s mixed approach pre-
serves prisoner autonomy as much as possible while maximizing pris-
oner safety, as well as explain why prisoner autonomy—particularly 
prisoner bodily autonomy—is so critical for prisoner wellbeing. Prisoner 
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bodily autonomy is paradoxical by definition. To have autonomy and 
bodily integrity, prisoners must be free from nonconsensual sex acts. At 
the same time, prisoners must have the ability to welcome consensual 
sex acts in order to be autonomous. On one hand, prohibitions on con-
sensual sex devalue consent by restricting an inmate’s control of his or 
her body.113 Simultaneously, implicitly granting others a sense of enti-
tlement to an inmate’s body is also a horrific violation of bodily integ-
rity.114 The Ninth Circuit’s mixed approach should be adopted uni-
formly by the circuit courts because it ensures prisoner autonomy by 
balancing these factors. 
Scholars promoting greater deference to inmate consent generally 
limit their arguments to relationships between inmates due to the 
power imbalances addressed earlier in this Comment.115 However, un-
der the dignity and sexual autonomy arguments these scholars support, 
it seems that consent in the inmate-guard context is indeed possible, 
though exceptionally rare. While supporting prisoner wellbeing is what 
motivates most advocates of the per se rule, precluding prisoners from 
the ability to give consent in any guard-inmate context whatsoever fur-
ther punishes prisoners by stripping them of some of the deepest layers 
of their bodily autonomy rather than shifting the focus to keeping 
guards accountable. To preserve autonomy while keeping inmates safe 
from sexual violence, the Ninth Circuit’s mixed approach strikes the 
right balance by adopting a strong presumption against consent while 
still promoting some degree of case-by-case analysis. The focus must be 
on how the prison context creates conditions that may ultimately be co-
ercive and mask assault under a guise of consent rather than imposing 
a per se rule. 
A. The Harms of Limiting Sexual Autonomy in Prison 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that adults have a right to 
personal autonomy and their bodily integrity.116 Though the Court has 
not explicitly addressed whether this right extends to prisoners, numer-
ous lower courts have determined inmates are indeed entitled to such 
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protection.117 Though courts primarily apply this principle in the con-
text of prisoners’ right to refuse medical treatment, the Tenth Circuit 
has extended it to the prison sexual assault context, holding inmates 
have “a constitutional right to be secure in [their] bodily integrity and 
free from attack by prison guards.”118 That said, incarceration in reality 
often strips inmates’ of their sexual autonomy by both limiting their 
ability to welcome wanted sexual interaction and placing them at high 
risk for sexual assault. 
This denial of bodily autonomy has significant negative conse-
quences for inmates. First, some scholars argue that absolving inmates 
of their sexual autonomy is a missed opportunity: greater sexual auton-
omy may help inmates achieve better societal integration upon re-
lease.119 Decriminalizing sexual interactions and treating truly consen-
sual sex acts as something positive for prisoners can support the 
development of healthy social skills and help mitigate the often trau-
matic nature of the current American prison system.120 In general, 
greater prisoner autonomy is linked to greater productivity in society 
after release.121 Increased autonomy can be empowering and healing.122 
Second, greater prisoner autonomy is linked to reductions in prison 
violence, particularly sexual violence.123 Some scholars argue bodily in-
tegrity in the form of “sexual self-determination”—meaning the ability 
to say both “no” and “yes” to sexual interactions—is critical to prevent-
ing sexual violence in the prison context.124 Additionally, prohibiting 
consensual sex can discourage prisoners from reporting instances of 
sexual assault.125 Instead, they often choose not to report for fear of be-
ing punished for engaging in any sexual activity at all.126 
Third, the mechanisms used to enforce limitations on sexual auton-
omy often require further infringement on prisoner bodily integrity, and 
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the PREA’s emphasis on surveillance of prison rape has exacerbated 
this issue.127 Prison surveillance systems are dehumanizing and simul-
taneously do not correct the problematic reporting mechanisms availa-
ble to victimized prisoners, nor do they remedy inadequate prison poli-
cies on consensual sex and rape.128 Surveillance often involves 
examining, touching, or even penetrating the prisoner’s naked body 
through searches or exams.129 After being discovered, prisoners may be 
placed in solitary confinement or lose “good time credits,” forcing them 
to remain in prison for a longer period of time.130 Both solitary confine-
ment and longer prison terms can render prisoners more vulnerable to 
sexual violence.131 Increased surveillance and greater restrictions on 
prisoner autonomy may reduce incidents of violent rape, but these ben-
efits require placing different yet significant limitations on inmate bod-
ily autonomy.132 
The need to protect prisoner autonomy as much as possible seems 
especially relevant in the context of a 2003 program developed by the 
National Institute of Corrections to provide training to correctional fa-
cilities. Throughout the program, only six of fifty-nine problems the par-
ticipating prison wardens and directors raised were about prisoner be-
havior, whereas thirty-two were about “staff-related” issues, including 
“staff sexual misconduct, staff morale, staff assaults on prisoners, con-
frontational episodes between staff and prisoners, the lack of ethnic di-
versity among staff, and difficulty recruiting and retaining quality 
staff.”133 
Because the party most at issue here is the prison guards, and more 
broadly the prison system that makes possible the coercive factors at 
play in guard-inmate relationships, it seems the legal system is respon-
sible for protecting prisoners as fully as possible. What it means to “pro-
tect,” however, is uncertain. The per se rule protects inmate autonomy, 
if autonomy means freedom from nonconsensual sex acts. The rule fol-
lowed by the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits supposedly also protects 
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inmate autonomy,134 if autonomy means the ability to welcome consen-
sual sex acts.135 Both rules are incomplete and limit prisoner freedom 
in some way, which seems inappropriate given prisoners’ extremely lim-
ited role in contributing to the problem of prison sexual assault. 
B. How the Ninth Circuit’s Mixed Approach Ensures Prisoner Safety 
For the compelling reasons enumerated above, this Comment em-
phasizes the importance of preserving as much prisoner bodily auton-
omy as possible while ensuring prisoner safety. This Comment also 
acknowledges that true consent between a correctional officer and a 
prisoner is rare. If courts were omniscient, they would probably observe 
that a significant proportion of prisoner-guard relationships that seem 
consensual at first glance are rooted in promises for prison contraband, 
protection, or special privileges or influenced by other coercive fac-
tors.136 However, the Ninth Circuit approach succeeds by acknowledg-
ing the serious risks intimate relationships between guards and in-
mates pose. The mixed approach creates a meaningful mechanism by 
which prisoners can raise claims of sexual assault and plausibly succeed 
while cultivating greater respect for their autonomy. The Ninth Cir-
cuit’s rule encompasses the benefits of the per se rule without diminish-
ing the value of inmate consent. 
The Ninth Circuit’s approach addresses the concerns raised by the 
most passionate advocates of the per se rule. The Ninth Circuit will find 
coercion occurred between a prisoner and guard if favors, privileges, or 
any type of exchange for sex is present, encompassing the less tangible 
factors that could render a seemingly consensual sexual relationship 
non-consensual.137 In addition, the correctional officer bears the burden 
of proving both parties consented to the sexual contact, reducing the 
burden on the inmate to gain access to information and representation 
that is more difficult to obtain in the prison context.138 
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Furthermore, inmates are “entitled to a presumption that any re-
lationship with a correctional officer is not consensual.”139 The pre-
sumption against consent is very strong: though numerous opinions 
from lower courts in the Ninth Circuit positively cite Wood, they do so 
for its presumption that sexual assault occurred, not its test for deter-
mining whether the inmate consented to the sex act in question.140 Fur-
thermore, the deterrent effect of the Ninth Circuit rule is significant. If 
correctional facilities are on notice that the presumption in the Ninth 
Circuit cuts strongly in favor of inmates, they will be incentivized to put 
in place policies that minimize inappropriate guard behavior. 
Furthermore, the court has chosen not to “attempt to exhaustively 
describe every factor which could be fairly characterized as coercive.”141 
This functionalist approach leaves plenty of room for lower courts to 
assess the facts of each inmate’s situation as a whole and determine 
whether coercion has taken place. Lower courts are not bound by a spe-
cific list of behaviors that constitute coercion, but rather are guided by 
the example of the short list of behaviors the Ninth Circuit did include 
in its opinion in Wood: “favors, privileges, or any type of exchange for 
sex,” which is already a very expansive definition of what constitutes 
coercion.142 The serious risks posed by inmate-guard relationships de-
mand a rigorous standard for inmate consent. Under the Ninth Circuit’s 
rule, the facts would have to be overwhelmingly in favor of consent in 
order for a court to find that the inmate was not influenced by outside 
factors more than he or she would be beyond the confines of the prison 
or jail. 
The Ninth Circuit’s mixed approach undeniably raises a question 
about judges’ and juries’ institutional capacity. Can courts effectively 
weigh competing concerns to determine whether a personal relation-
ship between a guard and an inmate included “coercive factors?” The 
facts alleged in prison sexual assault cases are often disputed and un-
clear, making it even more challenging for courts to come to case-by-
case conclusions regarding inmate consent. However, the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s presumption against consent is helpful in this regard. By requir-
ing that the facts be overwhelmingly in favor of consent in order for a 
court to find that the inmate was not influenced by coercive factors, the 
Ninth Circuit’s mixed approach reduces some of the burden on judges 
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and juries to make fine-grain factual determinations to accurately re-
solve prisoner sexual assault claims. 
C. How the Ninth Circuit Rule Increases Prisoner Autonomy: Defin-
ing Consent in the Prison Context 
The Ninth Circuit’s approach effectively achieves the aims of the 
per se rule, yet its greater preservation of prisoner autonomy is what 
sets it apart. The approach allows for greater inmate autonomy by ac-
knowledging that the fundamental human ability to welcome mutually 
agreed upon sexual interaction still holds some muster in the prison 
context, even if that ability is abridged. Whether consent is possible in 
the prison context is a highly controversial topic, particularly because 
inmate autonomy is so drastically constrained upon entry into the 
prison or jail. Inmates’ daily activities are constantly monitored and 
controlled by the prison system: they are told when to work, eat, sleep, 
and shower. 143 The state becomes inmates’ “landlord, employer, tailor, 
neighbor, and banker.”144 Prison is by design a harsh environment in-
tended to constrain what inmates can and cannot do. Some scholars de-
scribe prisons as “barren landscapes devoid of even the most basic ele-
ments of humanity.”145 
Given the austerity of the prison environment, every deprivation 
the prison system inflicts on prisoners is meaningful. One scholar lists 
seemingly little things like “missing family photos, confiscation of mag-
azines deemed contraband, broken radios, opened mail, and cold meals” 
as ways prisoners have said they are reminded of their lack of power 
and dignity.146 Importantly, it is difficult to determine from beyond 
prison walls what is most important to each individual prisoner. Poign-
antly, one inmate has said: 
What’s small to one man might be great to another. [An officer] 
goes home every day to his wife, to his mistress, to his boyfriend, 
to whatever. So, what he might think be small might be major 
to a guy who’s bein’ told when to eat, when to go to sleep, when 
to boo-boo, when not to boo-boo.147 
It is nearly impossible to effectively determine what deprivations 
of liberty will most dramatically impact a prisoner’s sense of dignity. 
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Most decision makers in courts and prisons have not been incarcerated 
themselves and can only understand to a certain extent what it means 
to have things that may seem insignificant to others but are important 
to them taken away. Therefore, minimizing restrictions on prisoner au-
tonomy—even those that seem negligible in their impact—is critical to 
prioritizing inmate wellbeing. 
As previously explained, the extreme power inequality between 
prisoners and guards is reason for concern when considering prisoners’ 
ability to consent, as well as prisoners’ greater susceptibility to stereo-
typing and physical abuse. Some argue that because the American 
prison system relies on “total control over the bodies and behaviors of 
prisoners” and depriving prisoners of any self-determination, incarcer-
ation cannot exist without total control over prisoner sexuality and de-
priving prisoners of any sexual self-determination as well.148 However, 
scholar Michele C. Nielsen’s analysis of whether consent is possible in 
constrained circumstances is helpful here. She explains that the claim 
that when “men construct the meaning of sexuality, they must also con-
struct the meaning of consent and even women’s experience of consent” 
is mistaken.149 Rather, she argues that “while much of the world is con-
structed by men, women can still maintain some autonomy within the 
warped system.150 
Similarly, prisoners are capable of consent in an imperfect, but ad-
equate, matter in some particular circumstances.151 Nielsen argues this 
imperfect consent is limited to inter-inmate relationships and that in-
mate-guard relationships are too steeped in power imbalance for even 
imperfect consent to be possible.152 However, claiming consent is com-
pletely impossible between any guard and any inmate is arbitrarily 
drawing a line. Although rooted in meaningful concerns about the 
power imbalance between guards and inmates generally, there are 
some specific circumstances where the coercive effects advocates of the 
per se rule are worried about are less relevant. For example, a guard 
may be stationed at a post unrelated to where the prisoner is being held, 
a situation that is especially possible in some of the country’s largest 
prisons. Alternatively, the guard may not engage in any exchange of 
special privileges or may not even have the access necessary to provide 
the inmate with the special privileges he or she desires. 
Some scholars argue that the constraints inmates face are more 
similar to those imposed on free women than they appear: significant 
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economic inequality and a heightened risk of being the victims of violent 
crime constrain women’s autonomy in the outside world.153 Though 
there may be some similarities that connect the experience of some in-
mates to some free women, they are very general in nature. The vast 
majority of inmates experience greater constraints on their personal au-
tonomy than most other members of society.154 Though societal and eco-
nomic pressures certainly impact how and why women consent in the 
outside world, their bodily autonomy is not constrained to the same de-
gree as that of the prisoner population: in most typical circumstances, 
they may decide for themselves when they want to eat, sleep, or shower. 
That said, there is a connection between the way inmates and free 
women consent. For both groups, their environment inherently impacts 
what constitutes a coercive factor and what consent must look like in 
order to bring about a truly voluntary—rather than a seemingly volun-
tary—interaction. In order to be a meaningful term, consent cannot 
maintain the same definition across circumstances. Rather, it must re-
flect the constraints the environment imposes on the individual in ques-
tion. Consensual sex is “life affirming, restorative, and rejuvenating.”155 
Nonconsensual sex is dehumanizing and traumatizing. This distinction 
is mobile: it changes based on the context in which the individual in 
question is giving consent. 
In order to appropriately define what consent looks like in a partic-
ular situation, courts must strive to understand how individuals actu-
ally resist sexual advances given the constraints of that situation. In 
the prison context, sociologists have found that when inmates push 
back on correctional officers’ harassment, they do so in a subtle manner 
to avoid retaliatory action, either through avoiding the problematic 
guards or appearing indifferent to their advances.156 However, under 
the framework advanced by the Eighth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, 
these subtle methods of resistance are insufficient for a prisoner to show 
he or she did not consent to the guard’s advances.157 
Proponents of the per se rule may argue that the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach does not really afford prisoners greater autonomy because it 
is unlikely a guard-inmate relationship will reach the threshold neces-
sary to be deemed consensual given the rigor of the test. However, pri-
oritizing greater prisoner autonomy does not mean disregarding pris-
oner safety. Prisoner-guard relationships are at high risk for becoming 
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coercive, and this reality must be taken into account when developing 
legal rules surrounding those relationships. Rather, the legal system 
must prioritize prisoner autonomy as much as ensuring prisoner safety 
allows. Here, a rebuttable presumption rule provides for greater—albeit 
imperfect—prisoner autonomy to welcome consensual sexual relation-
ships while maximizing prisoner autonomy to be free from unwelcome 
sexual contact. 
D. Power Imbalances and Consent Outside the Prison Context 
Despite the advantages of the Ninth Circuit rule for prisoner au-
tonomy, advocates of the per se rule argue inmates are similar enough 
to other groups whose sexual autonomy is constrained by the law or 
private policies to justify a per se approach. In order to flesh out this 
distinction, it is helpful to compare the per se rule in the inmate-guard 
context to more widely accepted per se rules against certain forms of 
sexual contact, such as those against statutory rape of minors under the 
age of consent, university policies against intimate relationships be-
tween students and professors, and workplace policies against intimate 
relationships between employees and their superiors. 
1. Statutory rape 
Minors’ inability to consent to sexual contact is not a compelling 
analog to the validity of inmate consent to sexual relations with a guard. 
This Comment certainly does not purport to argue prisoners are in the 
same position to consent to sex acts as two fully autonomous adults, but 
rather that comparing them to children as a means of justifying a per 
se rule is too extreme of an analogy. 
Accepting an argument that compares inmates to children, as 
much of the scholarship on this topic has, is a devastating blow to pris-
oner autonomy. It is understandably tempting to characterize inmates 
this way when so much of their lives are dictated by the prison system. 
However, labeling members of marginalized groups as child-like while 
stripping them of their autonomy is a familiar tool utilized by oppres-
sors throughout history to demean the disfavored. In addition, labeling 
prisoners as child-like disregards the reality that prisoners continue to 
have the normal sexual desires of adulthood upon entering prison, as 
well as a desire to develop romantic relationships and reap the benefits 
of connection with others. Prisoners often view prison regulations as 
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intentionally “diminish[ing] their maturity” by “treating them like chil-
dren and fostering dependency.”158 An inmate-centric approach to re-
solving the epidemic of sexual assault in prison should take into account 
this concern; the Ninth Circuit does so by weighing prisoner autonomy 
in the rule-making calculus while accounting for the ways prison gives 
rise to the power imbalances that make guard-inmate relationships 
high risk. 
2. Student-professor and employee-supervisor relationships 
Relationships between students and professors or employees and 
supervisors are a closer analog to inmate-guard relationships. In these 
relationships, an imbalance in power exists between two adults, in-
creasing the likelihood of coercive factors making a seemingly consen-
sual relationship more harmful than it first appears. However, some 
significant differences exist between the position of prisoners and that 
of students and employees that render the analogy between these 
groups an incomplete one. 
For students and employees, classrooms and workplaces comprise 
one aspect of their lives. At the end of the day, they are able to go home 
and have alternative avenues to pursue sexual pleasure completely un-
related to academic or professional life. They have access to dating ap-
plications and social events and may come and go as they please. In 
contrast, inmates do not have the same luxury. Their pool of options is 
limited to the people who live or work in the prison or jail, and the over-
whelming majority of prisons and jails prohibit all inmate sexual activ-
ity of any kind anyways, often including self-stimulation. 
Furthermore, in the case of minors, university students, and em-
ployees, they are unable to consent as a result of either being in a posi-
tion they have chosen to enter with some degree of control or a position 
they are in as a virtue of a relatively normal stage of life. This is often 
not the case with prison. A variety of factors influence an individual’s 
likelihood of incarceration. For example, people living in rural areas are 
50 percent more likely to be incarcerated than city dwellers.159 In addi-
tion, African Americans are “incarcerated at more than five times the 
rate of whites,” and African American women are incarcerated at two 
times the rate of white women.160 In fact, “if African Americans and 
Hispanics were incarcerated at the same rates as whites, prison and jail 
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 159 Eli Hager, A Mass Incarceration Mystery, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.t 
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 160 Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP (last visited Feb. 2, 2019), https://www.naacp.org/crim 
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populations would decline by almost forty percent.”161 Moreover, schol-
ars estimate 20,000 American inmates are wrongfully incarcerated, 
comprising one percent of the American prison population.162 Though 
most inmates have made voluntary choices to engage in criminal activ-
ity, acknowledging the flaws within the American criminal justice sys-
tem is critical to developing policies that adequately ensure prisoners’ 
rights and wellbeing.163 
It is true some employees may be coerced into sexual activity out of 
fear of losing their jobs, knowing they need to provide for themselves or 
for their families. This Comment fully acknowledges the significant 
power of economic coercion. However, the total loss of control inherent 
in the prison context is simply greater than it is in universities and most 
places of work. Though it is by no stretch of the imagination easy to 
leave one’s job for another or transfer universities, that option is avail-
able to students and employees. In contrast, prisoners have no control 
over their conditions and often have no means of changing their circum-
stances. Particularly for those prisoners serving decades-long sen-
tences, it seems unreasonable to compare restrictions on their sexual 
activity to those on students and employees. 
E. Weighing Other Proposed Solutions in the Context of the Ninth 
Circuit Rule 
At first glance, conjugal visits appear to be a meaningful way to 
improve prisoner sexual autonomy. However, this system disfavors in-
mates that enter prison without a long-term partner willing to visit 
them, especially those inmates serving longer prison terms. Another po-
tential solution is permitting consensual sexual relationships between 
inmates:164 decriminalizing inter-inmate sexual contact may decrease 
incidents of sexual assault by reducing the “ideal victimhood” of in-
mates starved for physical intimacy.165 
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Ultimately, this Comment does not purport to suggest the Ninth 
Circuit rule alone is sufficient to create an environment where prison-
ers’ bodily and sexual autonomy is honored. If carefully implemented, 
policies permitting relationships between inmates may be an effective 
way to balance prisoner protection and autonomy, but determining the 
legitimacy of that solution is beyond the scope of this Comment. The 
Ninth Circuit rule does not attempt to resolve the question of inter-in-
mate relationships’ legitimacy. Rather, it specifically addresses the 
abridged ability to consent that prisoners maintain upon entering the 
correctional system in the context of inmate-guard relationships. Bal-
ancing this autonomy against its risks is an important step towards 
cultivating greater respect for prisoner bodily integrity. 
F. The Discursive Effects of the Ninth Circuit Rule 
Courts’ decisions as to whether consent is possible in the prison 
context between inmates and correctional officers have effects far be-
yond specific Eighth Amendment sexual assault cases that come before 
the judiciary. In fact, if the Ninth Circuit approach will result in very 
few cases in which a prison guard may effectively utilize inmate consent 
as an affirmative defense, the outcomes for prisoners bringing sexual 
assault claims will be only slightly different than if there were a per se 
rule. As a result, one could argue prisoner autonomy is not really better 
preserved under the Ninth Circuit’s rule than it would be under a per 
se rule against consent. 
However, prisoners are not the only population to consider when 
weighing which legal rule is appropriate in these circumstances. Courts 
should also consider the rule’s impact on judges, policymakers, attor-
neys, and high-level officials within correctional facilities. These are the 
individuals who develop the regulations that impact inmates on a daily 
basis and who are most likely to be aware of changes in the law pertain-
ing to prison issues. If the law dehumanizes prisoners and creates an 
image of them as incapable of making decisions about their own bodily 
integrity and autonomy, that image will be reflected in the rules these 
stakeholders establish. Instead of granting prisoners more control over 
their lives in prison—a step critical to improving inmate quality of life—
imbuing into the law a child-like image of inmates and their capabilities 
incentivizes stakeholders to enact regulations that further constrain 
prisoner autonomy, an outcome that will ultimately act as a detriment 
to prisoner wellbeing. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit rule is a step forward in preserving 
prisoner autonomy by both protecting inmates from unwanted advances 
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and allowing them to make decisions core to their bodily integrity for 
themselves. While a per se rule is appropriate in some contexts, it is 
telling that no circuit court has adopted it to understand how consent 
operates between inmates and guards in the prison environment. Per-
haps most importantly, the Ninth Circuit rule reflects an important re-
ality about the definition of consent. It is fluid and hinges on the situa-
tion in which an individual is giving it to another. While the consent 
between a guard and inmate differs from the consent between individ-
uals elsewhere, the ultimate aim is the same across contexts: to utilize 
consent as a tool to protect individual autonomy, both to be free from 
forced sexual advances and to welcome those that are wanted. 
